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SPAIN'S DOUBLE SHOCK: HINDSIGHT FROM THE UNITED
STATES REGARDING AN IMMIGRATION INFLUX AND ITS
EFFECT ON SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDING
ALEXANDER V. IFILL*
"Like the famous river that many poor Mexicans cross to reach
the wealthy United States, the Mediterranean Sea divides prosper-
ous aging Europe from a highly populated, youthful, and eco-
nomically underdeveloped North Africa."'
1. INTRODUCTION
Spain, similar to the United States due to an increasing age
structure, is concerned about reaching a date beyond which there
will be too few active workers relative to those retired.2 The de-
pendency ratio - the ratio of older adults to younger adults - has
been rising in both the United States and Spain.3 People are living
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S. Econom-
ics, 2004, the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. The author would like
to sincerely thank everyone who made this Comment possible.
1 Martin Baldwin-Edwards, The Changing Mosaic of Mediterranean Migrations,
MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE, June 2004, http://www.migrationinformation
.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=230.
2 See, e.g., Rickard Sandell, Spain's Population: The Bigger the Better? Ways of
Guessing the Future (Real Instituto Elcano, ARI Report No. 58/2005, 2005), available
at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/736/Sandel736.pdf (forecasting
that Spain's aging process may be worse than the EU-25 average).
3 See ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: SPAIN 144
(2005) [hereinafter SPAIN ECONOMIC SURVEY] (explaining that current projections in
Spain "forecast a rise of 33 percentage points in the dependency ratio of the eld-
erly by 2050 ...."); see also Theodore C. Bergstrom & John L. Hartman, Demo-
graphics and the Political Sustainability of Pay-as-you-go Social Security 13 (Dec.
7, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of International Economic Law) (analyzing the tax implications of main-
taining the current social security benefits in the United States given the growing
dependency ratio).
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longer, 4 the first baby boomers are nearing retirement, and the na-
tive birth rate is low.5 Furthermore, experts predict the depend-
ency ratio will continue to rise. 6 Some hypothesize that the de-
crease in the active labor force will result in a significant shortage
of social security funding.7 In response, some immigration advo-
cates reply that since immigration fundamentally changes a na-
tion's age structure, it is a helpful means of stalling an escalating
dependency ratio.8 This Comment confirms that Spain has listened
4 See Agar Brugiavini & Franco Peracchi, The Length of Working Lives in
Europe, 3 J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N 477, 479 (2005) (explaining that in the past 40 years,
life expectancy in the EU has increased by 5 to 10 years in most countries).
5 See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2005 (2005) (estimat-
ing Spain's birth rate at 1.010% and the United States' birth rate at 1.1414%); see
also Colectivo Io6, Inmigrantes Extranjeros en Espafia: lReconfigurando la Sociedad?,
PANORAMA SOCIAL, June 2005, at 32, 42-43 (showing more than 10% births in Spain
during 2004 were from immigrant mothers); INSTITTO NACIONAL DE ESTADiSTICA
[NAT'L INST. STATISTICS], POBLACION [POPULATION] 2006, available at http://
www.ine.es/prodyser/pubweb/espcif/pobl06.pdf (providing an explanation
from INE, Spain's National Institute of Statistics, that 76.4% of the country's
demographic growth in 2004 was due to immigration).
6 See, e.g., FRANK B. HOBBS WITH BONNIE L. DAMON, U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES 2-22 (1996) [hereinafter 65+ IN THE UNITED
STATES] (projecting that, for the United States, the ratio of elderly persons to those
of working age (20 to 64 years) will nearly double between 1990 and 2050).
7 See SPAIN ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 3, at 144 ("[P]rojections carried out
in 2000 for all the OECD countries pointed to the ratio of public pension spending
to GDP rising by 8 percentage points by 2050, as against 3 to 4 percentage points
in the rest of the OECD."); see also ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., POLICY BRIEF:
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF SPAIN, 2005, at 6 (2005) [hereinafter OECD POLICY BRIEF] (list-
ing the "long-term sustainability of public finances, with particular attention to
the public pension schemes" among the most important fiscal policy issues for
Spain).
8 Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan pointed out economic
effects that could result from an aging global population. In February 2003,
Greenspan stated,
[T]he aging of the population in the United States will have significant
effects on our fiscal situation. In particular, it makes our Social Security
and Medicare programs unsustainable in the long run, short of a major
increase in immigration rates, a dramatic acceleration in productivity
growth well beyond historical experience, a significant increase in the
age of eligibility for benefits, or the use of general revenue to fund bene-
fits.
Testimony of Alan Greenspan before the Special Committee on Aging, U.S.
Senate, February 2003, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
testimony/ 2003/20030227/ default.htm.
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to these advocates while executing its recent immigration strate-
gies.9 However, considering that immigration adds both to the
working-age population and to the future dependent population,
an important question remains: Are immigrants' age differences
when compared to natives' large enough to fundamentally alter a
country's age structure, in turn reducing the impact of demo-
graphic shocks to an intergenerational social security system?10
In recent years, the influx of immigrants to Spain has done
more than merely change Spain's urban appearance." New labor
market participants have emerged. 12 As a result, social security
funding is arriving from previously nonexistent contributors.'
3
Spanish economic strategists ask themselves whether such a rapid
increase in immigration provides a net benefit to the country's so-
cial security fund and decreases the dependency ratio. These
strategists may benefit from a comparison of Spain's situation with
that of the United States. The United States, as a country with a
9 For example, in 2005, during a controversial three month amnesty period,
Spain processed work papers for an estimated 690,679 illegal immigrants already
living in the country. See Joaquin Arango & Maia Jachimowicz, Regularizing Im-
migrants in Spain: A New Approach, MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE, Sept. 2005,
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=331 (explaining
that one motive behind the three month amnesty period is to stop so-called clan-
destinos (illegal immigrants) from working in the black economy and to have them
pay taxes and social security).
10 See generally MINISTERIO DE TRABAJO Y ASUNTOS SOCIALES [MINISTRY OF
LABOR & SOC. AFFAIRS], REPORT ON THE SPANISH STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE OF THE
PENSION SYSTEM 18 (2005) [hereinafter SPANISH STRATEGY FOR FUTURE PENSIONS]
(explaining that, despite immigration, the percentage of young people aged be-
tween 15 and 19 has decreased over the 1990 to 2004 period).
11 See Alex Balch, Spain, in IMMIGRATION AS A LABOUR MARKET STRATEGY 159,
at 161 (Jan Niessen & Yongmi Schibel eds., 2005) (explaining that based on the lo-
cal register of inhabitants "[t]he foreign population has jumped from less than 1
million in 1999 to over 3.6 million in 2005."); see also BANCO DE ESPAFJA [BANK OF
SPAIN], Inmigraci6n: Desarrollos Recientes y Consecuencias Econ6micas [Immigration:
Recent Developments and Economic Consequences], in BOLETfN ECONOMIcO 41, 41
(2005) [hereinafter BOLETfN ECONOMICO] (indicating that immigrants accounted for
roughly 1% of the population in 1991 as compared to about 8% in 2005).
12 See, e.g., KrrY CALAVITA, IMMIGRANTS AT THE MARGINS: LAW, RACE, AND
EXCLUSION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE 68 (2005) (highlighting that immigrants mostly
"fill critical niches in the economy -usually those that have been vacated by Span-
ish workers").
13 See id. (indicating the role imnmigrants are having in entering the work-
force).
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history of immigration, antidiscrimination laws, and cultural di-
versity, may serve as a practical example of how immigration af-
fects funding and of the dependency ratio inherent in an intergen-
erational social security system. 1
4
This Comment argues that although immigration may partially
contribute to solving the social security funding problem, the U.S.
experience predicts that Spain will not solve the funding problem
solely through increased immigration. As such, Spain needs to
consider legislative reform of its social security program and re-
structure its currently questionable immigration law.15 This Com-
ment's subsequent analysis illustrates the importance of adjusting
immigration legislation proactively in order to obtain the maxi-
mum benefits from immigration. When referring to immigration,
this Comment targets the group of migrants to Spain from coun-
tries outside of the European Union. Due to EU policies discussed
below, Spain has limited control over the entrance of EU citizens.
Therefore, this Comment focuses on the entrance of non-EU citi-
zens. This restraint reflects the reality that a major segment of
working-age immigrants to Spain comes from non-EU countries. 16
Section 2 considers whether current alarms regarding social se-
curity funding crises in the United States and Spain are valid. Sec-
tion 3 analyzes current legal approaches to immigration in both the
United States and Spain and discerns how the approaches have in-
fluenced immigration flows. After discussing the differences in the
countries' approaches to immigration legislation, Section 4 then
explores the social security funding implications of a more strate-
gic immigration plan. Section 5 suggests proposals for Spain. The
proposals are based on the premise that there is no single solution,
14 See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS 95-96 (1995) (suggesting that integration of immigrants into a
country requires that the host nation enforce antidiscrimination laws and be cul-
turally accommodating).
15 See Arango & Jachimowicz, supra note 9 (attributing unauthorized immi-
gration to a "poorly managed and financed administrative bureaucracy for the
management of immigration, well-developed migration networks, and geo-
graphical or cultural proximity to dynamic source countries").
16 See, e.g., Balch, supra note 11, at 159 ("New immigration is mainly from
Latin American, North African and Eastern European countries, with proportion-
ately less now coming from other EU countries."); BOLETfN ECONOMIcO, supra note
11, at 42 (mentioning that about 77.9% of all foreign-born residents in Spain come
from non-EU countries).
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but rather a mix of policy measures that could solve the problem.
Above all, the proposals highlight the need to reform current Span-
ish immigration legislation in order to benefit from possible syner-
gies between immigration and social security funding. First, Spain
should abstain from "spontaneous" immigration legislation and
ensure social, economic, and political integration of its immigrants.
Second, Spain should more scrupulously select its immigrants,
concentrating on satisfying labor market demands and boosting
social security receipts while reducing future fiscal burdens. Third,
Spain should consider alternatives to its current social security sys-
tem, such as a progressive decline in state-sponsored benefits or
movement toward privatization.
2. SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDING: IS THE PESSIMISM BEHIND THE PAY-
As-You-Go SYSTEM WELL-FOUNDED?
Currently, many social security systems entail a transfer
scheme where taxes are collected from the current workforce to
pay pensions for the previous, and now retired, workforce. 17 As a
result, many countries are concerned with the imminent retirement
of a big portion of the labor force, the baby boomers.18 Projections
indicate a potential demographic imbalance as a result of baby
boomer retirement.' 9 Countries facing this conundrum, such as the
United States and Spain, must analyze the feasibility of their cur-
rent social security systems and the possibility of legislative reform
to meet future funding challenges. Otherwise, these countries may
face a day when there are too few active workers to sustain the
pensions of the previous, retired workforce.
Despite decades-old concerns regarding Social Security fund-
ing, the United States has not enacted major reform of the Social
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 901(b) (2000) ("It shall be the duty of the Administration to
administer the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program under sub-
chapter II of this chapter and the supplemental security income program under
subchapter XVI of this chapter.").
18 See INT'L MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT No. 05/56, SPAIN: STAFF
REPORT FOR THE 2004 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION 14 (2005) (illustrating that the fis-
cal implication of aging with respect to pension reform will be a likely demo-
graphic shock if left unattended).
19 Id. at 15 ("Spain's demographic profile implies a peak in the dependency
ratio in about 40 years ... ").
2007]
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Security system since 1983.20 Yet reports have found that the U.S.
retired population relies on Social Security as its only source of in-
come at progressively higher rates. 21 Nonetheless, the fiscal conse-
quences of population aging in Spain may be different since U.S.
Social Security benefits are less generous relative to earnings than
benefits in Spain.22 The following two subsections explore the evo-
lution and current state of both countries' social security systems.
2.1. U.S. Social Security: The Mechanics, Problems, and Reactions
In 1935, President Roosevelt signed the basic social security
program into law, partly in response to the Depression.23 Social
Security-known as Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
("OASDI") -represents one of the largest domestic spending pro-
grams in the United States. 24 In brief, the existing system works as
follows. Throughout their working lives, employees and their em-
ployers contribute to the overall Social Security fund via a tax on
payrolls. In turn, these contributions sustain current pensioners.
Any contributions in excess of current pension payouts are in-
20 See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 123, 97 Stat.
65, 87-89 (1983) (accelerating scheduled tax increases); id. § 201, 97 Stat. at 107-09
(increasing the retirement age).
21 See 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 6, at 4-14 (finding that since the
1940s, there has been a marked increase in reliance on Social Security). In 1992,
Social Security benefits were the primary source of income for 63% of beneficiar-
ies. See id. In the United States, reliance on Social Security may be due to the high
esteem with which it is viewed by citizens. See Michael Tanner, Public Opinion and
Social Security Privatization, CATO PROJECT ON Soc. SECURITY PRIVATIZATION (Cato
Inst., Wash., D.C.), Aug. 6, 1996, at 2 fig.1 (showing that 68% of Americans have a
favorable opinion of Social Security, as compared to 28% and 25% who look fa-
vorably upon the federal income tax system and welfare, respectively).
22 See OECD POLICY BRIEF, supra note 7, at 7 ("The impact of ageing [sic] will
be felt later on but more acutely than in other OECD countries, because it will be
more pronounced than elsewhere and because the parameters underlying pension
calculations are more generous ... ").
23 See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
24 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY
BULLETIN 2005, at 5.1 tbl.5.A1 (illustrating that retired workers and their spouses
make up the largest group of beneficiaries given that they represent 33,024,800 of
the total 47,707,380 OASDI beneficiaries). OASDI also provides benefits for dis-
abled workers and for dependents and survivors of disabled and retired workers.
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vested in the equivalent of treasury bonds, with the aim of increas-
ing the Social Security fund.
25
More specifically, to qualify for retirement benefits, employees
must pay a minimum tax threshold to earn the currently required
forty credits.26 Retirement benefit payments are based on an em-
ployee's earnings averaged over thirty-five years of his working
life. 27 Upon retirement, a worker satisfying the minimum neces-
sary contributions is eligible for payments based in part on the
amount of his contributions. The Social Security Administration
("SSA") determines monthly benefits by first calculating the retired
employee's Average Indexed Monthly Earnings ("AIME").28 AIME
denotes the employee's lifetime average monthly income, adjusted
for inflation, during the group of years where earnings were high-
est. The SSA uses AIME to calculate monthly benefits by applying
a weighted structure: 90% rate to the first AIME portion, 32% rate
to the following AIME portion, and 15% rate to the remaining
AIME up until the maximum wage base.29 The dollar amounts to
which the rates are applied are adjusted annually based on
changes in average wages.30 Other factors such as receiving bene-
fits before age sixty-five, delaying retirement past age sixty-five, or
having earnings after benefits begin may have the effect of increas-
ing or reducing retirement benefits.31
25 See BD. OF TRS., FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST
FUNDS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 135 tbl.VI.A5 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL
TRUSTEES REPORT] (detailing the break-up of the Social Security Trust Fund In-
vestments).
26 See A Glossary of Social Security Terms, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE,
http://www.ssa.gov/glossary.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2007) ("As you work and
pay taxes, you earn credits that count toward your eligibility for future Social Se-
curity benefits. You can earn a maximum of four credits each year. Most people
need 40 credits to qualify for benefits.")
27 See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65
(1983).
28 See 2006 ANNUAL TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 25, at 99 tbl.V.C1 (explaining
the components factored into AIME calculations).
29 Id. at 102.
30 See id. (explaining that the three ranges for calculating AIME are set but
that the dollar amounts to which the ranges are applied vary by year).
31 See DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 15-16 (2000)
(highlighting that deciding to retire before or after the age sixty-five benchmark
can decrease or increase one's benefits, respectively, corresponding to the amount
of time one deviates from the benchmark).
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Social Security, as currently implemented, serves as a method
of poverty-prevention insurance. By yielding fixed annual benefits
for the duration of the employee's life, Social Security provides in-
surance against the possibility that one will live longer than ex-
pected and prematurely consume all of the assets previously ac-
cumulated for retirement. Since retirees' pensions are funded by
the contributions of the current workforce, each generation of
workers is connected to the previous workforce and the future
workforce. The intergenerational structure has worked so far, but
this system is inherently susceptible to demographic shocks. What
happens if there is an overwhelming retired population as com-
pared to the current workforce? Alternatively, what if current
pensioners consume too much and thus leave future generations
without adequate reserves?
Despite varying projections, both the Congressional Budget Of-
fice ("CBO") and the Social Security Trustees foresee demographic
concerns regarding the future financing of an intergenerational
system. Both entities predict that a baby boomer demographic
shock may disrupt the intergenerational system around the middle
of the twenty-first century. 32 Despite the decades-long debate
about social security funding in the United States, implementation
of change has been mild. For example, as early as 1982, the OASDI
funds were in financial trouble.33 As an interim measure, Congress
enacted legislation that permitted temporary borrowing from fed-
eral trust funds to cover the financial shortage. 34 Subsequently, in
1983, congressional reforms ensued.35 The reforms increased the
Social Security tax rate with the aim of generating a surplus in the
trust fund which at yearend would be invested in U.S. Treasury se-
32 See SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., RETIREMENT SECURITY: THE UNFOLDING OF A
PREDICTABLE SURPRISE 15, 17 (2005) [hereinafter PREDICTABLE SURPRISE] (revealing
the proximity in projections of CBO and the Trustees).
33 See CHRIsTrNE Scorr, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., SOCIAL SECURITY: THE TRUST
FUND, at CRS-4 tbl.1 (illustrating 1982 and 1983 as the years with the largest nega-
tive current account balance in the Trust Fund).
34 See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65
(1983). Despite minor amendments to Social Security after 1983, Congress has not
implemented any significant change to tackle the potential future deficit of the
Trust Fund.
35 See generally OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SUMMARY OF THE
1983 SOCIAL SECURITY TRUSTEES REPORT 3 (1983) (summarizing the main provision
of the Social Security Amendments of 1983).
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curities.36 The reforms also called for an increase in the normal re-
tirement age.
37
Despite the 1983 reforms, continuing threats of financial defi-
ciencies led to the formation of the Advisory Council on Social Se-
curity. The Advisory Council would revisit features of the 1935
Act on an ongoing basis and propose reforms to cushion suscepti-
ble demographic shocks or long-range deficits. Faced with a con-
tinuous funding concern, the 1994-1996 Advisory Council made
three proposals for reform.38 The first option was a "Personal Se-
curity Account Plan" that suggested gradual replacement of the
current system with mandatory savings in individual accounts.39
The second alternative was an "Individual Account Plan" to sup-
plement the existing program with mandatory retirement saving in
individual accounts. 40 The third suggestion was a "Maintain Bene-
fits Plan" that called for investing part of the Trust Fund surplus in
the stock market in hopes of higher rates of return than U.S. Treas-
ury Bonds.41 Options one and two aimed to eliminate the inter-
generational feature of the current system by making each worker
more individually responsible for funding his own future pension
stream. Meanwhile, option three aimed to increase the overall
fund by assuming riskier investments in the hope of greater re-
turns than the risk-free Treasury bond market investments. Ana-
lysts for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York labeled the Advi-
sory Council's three plans as highly susceptible to market risk.42
36 See Susan Miller, The Market to the Rescue? The Promise - and the Price - of
the New Social Security Investment Proposals, CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN., Aug.
1997, at 2 (detailing the effects of the 1983 Congressional reforms with respect to
the social security trust fund).
37 See PREDICTABLE SURPRISE, supra note 32, at 20 (explaining that the increase
in "Normal Retirement Age from 65 to 67 [was] deferred and gradually phased
in").
38 1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., REPORT OF THE 1994-1996
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY VOLUME 1: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/adcouncil/report/toc
.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2007) (note that the Advisory Council has been replaced
by the Social Security Advisory Board).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See Miller, supra note 36, at 4 (noting the high volatility that is characteristic
of equity returns and the difficulty in reasonably estimating the likely equity re-
turns that future investors can expect).
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These analysts suggested that the volatility of stock returns may
not be worth their higher equity premium as compared to treasury
bonds. 43 However, there are valid counterarguments. First, by
making each worker accountable for his own future pension
stream, each worker will be able to assume a level of risk adequate
for his particular economic status. Second, transitioning to an in-
dividual system eliminates many intergenerational demographic
problems. Third, though there is more market risk with the Advi-
sory Council's proposals, an individual system rather than the int-
ergenerational system will reduce political risk when compared to
the current intergenerational system where all workers are subject
to the risk that legislators will alter the system. The weakness in
these counterarguments is that they assume a high level of investor
sophistication. Certainly, it would be extreme to assume that all
workers are sufficiently educated about the market to make the
adequate risk/return investments for their situation.
Despite multiple proposals by economists, politicians, and oth-
ers, the United States has not passed any major reform to its Social
Security system since 1983.44 What remains clear is that currently
the general approach to social security relies on maintaining a trust
fund surplus. Erosion of the surplus, without reform, may have
devastating effects on future retirees.
2.2. Spain's Seguridad Social and the Creation of a Reserve Fund
The basic Social Security Act of 196345 created the Spanish so-
cial security system. The 1978 Constitution reiterated that the so-
cial security system shall provide benefits to all eligible nationals
who live and work in Spain and their families, as well as foreigners
with legal residence permits.46 The system provides benefits that
include workers' compensation, medical care, hospitalization, re-
tirement pension, disability, and unemployment.47 Retirement
43 Id.
44 See PREDICTABLE SURPRISE, supra note 32, at 10 (showing that despite reform,
social security solvency remains a crucial item in the SSA agenda).
45 Ley de Bases de la Seguridad Social [Social Security Bases Act] (B.O.E.
1963, 193).
46 C.E., art. 41.
47 Id.
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constitutes the largest portion of the system.48 Spain's social secu-
rity system is divided into various contribution groups based on
occupation classes: general, agricultural, domestic, and self-
employed are the largest groups.49 The general group is the com-
mon scheme where the employee and the employer each contrib-
ute to the system. The occupation classes require different contri-
bution levels. For example, domestic services require a lower rate
than agriculture services.5 0
Law 26/1985 was passed in reaction to the emerging debate
about a funding shortage and was the most radical in terms of cost
containment.5' The law extended the minimum contribution pe-
riod from ten to fifteen years and extended the period used to cal-
culate pension base from two to eight years prior to retirement.5
2
Extension of the pension base put a stop to the widespread practice
among employees called "pension buying."53 The practice encour-
aged employees to agree with the employer -a couple years before
retirement -to make a contribution proportional to their maximum
salary to maximize retirement pension.54 Despite the cost contain-
ment measures of the 1985 reform, reports revealed the continued
increase of average pensions5 5 and in turn, concern over a funding
shortage. Since 1985, three major laws have modified basic social
48 Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jimenez-Martin & Franco Peracchi, Social Security
and Retirement in Spain 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
6136, 1997) (highlighting that "[p]ublic pensions represent the most important
welfare program in Spain," accounting for the vast majority of total spending for
social welfare programs).
49 Ley General de la Seguridad Social (B.O.E. 1994, 1) [General Law of Social
Security].
50 Id. art. 222.
51 Arts. II-Ill of the Ley de Medidas urgentes para la racionalizaci6n de la
estructura y de la acci6n protectora de la Seguridad Social (B.O.E. 1985, 26) [Ur-
gent Measures for the Rationalization of the Structure and the Protective Action of
Social Security].
52 Id.
53 See Maria Irazusta, Quines Sufrirdn el Recorte de las Pensiones: Gobierno y sin-
dicatos pactan la temida reforma de la Seguridad Social, EL MUNDO, Sept. 22, 1996
(providing numerical examples of how pension buying can be used to manipulate
returns to contributions).
54 Id.
55 Spanish Strategy for Future Pensions, supra note 10, at 14 (demonstrating
that the percentage increase in real terms for the average pension was 2.6% for the
1985-1990 period and 2.4% for the 1990-1995 period -significantly higher than
the 1.5% increase during the 1980-1985 period).
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security: Law 1/1994, Law 24/1997, and Law 28/2003. The first
was passed under Socialist rule, and the last two under the conser-
vative Popular Party.
Law 1/199456 barely modified Law 26/1985. Consequently, as
Spain progressed to the date where inflows into the social security
system would be less than outflows, due to a baby boomer retire-
ment demographic shock, the Congressional Committee on Budg-
ets Commission (lower house) presented the Toledo Pact of 1995.57
The agreement was promptly approved by the Congress of Depu-
ties.58 The Toledo Pact ensures continuity of the current social se-
curity system and compliance with Article 41 of the Spanish Con-
stitution, which requires a public social security system.59 The Pact
recognizes the need to counter two main problems: 1) increasing
costs and 2) impending demographic shocks in the form of a dis-
proportionately aged population. The government passed Law
24/1997 with these two objectives in mind.
The Toledo Pact sparked Law 24/1997 on the Consolidation
and Rationalization of the Social Security System.60 The law pro-
vides for regulatory monitoring measures, including a more active
advisory role of the National Institute of Social Security (INESS).
INESS's role is comparable to the Advisory Council on Social Secu-
rity created in the United States during the 1980s. Law 24/1997 fo-
cused on cost containment measures and increasing contributions.
First, Law 24/1997 further extended the period used to calculate
the pension base from the last eight to the last fifteen years of
work.61 Second, the law tried to incentivize workers to continue
56 Article 10 of the Ley General de la Seguridad Social (B.O.E. 1994, 1) [Gene-
ral Law of Social Security].
57 See Jose A. Herce & Javier Alonso Meseguer, La reforna de las pensiones ante
la revisi6n del Pacto de Toledo, 19 COLECCION EsTuDIos ECONOMICOS 1, 21-26 (2002),
available at http://www.pdf.lacaixa.comunicacions.com/ee/esp/eel9_esp.pdf
(consisting of 15 general recommendations, the Pact of Toledo received support
from trade unions and managers because it advised the adoption of measures
which pleased both parts, such as the improvement of certain benefits, the reduc-
tion of social contributions whenever possible, and the prosecution of fraud in
contributions as well as in benefits).
58 Pacto de Toledo (B.O.C.G. 1995, 134).
59 C.E., art. 41.
60 Ley de consolidaci6n y racionalizaci6n del Sistema de Seguridad Social
(B.O.E. 1997, 24) [hereinafter Ley 24/1997] [Law of Consolidation and Rationaliza-
tion of the Social Security System].
61 Id. art. 4.
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working beyond the age of sixty-five.62 Given Spain's previously
high unemployment rates, 63 certain lobbies argued that the law
would adversely affect the most destitute.64 However, this aspect
is less criticized today since unemployment rates are falling. Third,
Article 1 of Law 24/1997 contained measures to create a previously
non-existent reserve fund for social security, and to clarify the fi-
nancial instruments reserved for the social security reserve fund.65
The enactment of Law 28/200366 reinforces the importance of
directing the social security surplus to the Reserve Fund rather
than using it to fund other agencies. The law specifically defines
what constitutes a surplus, 67 provides for the creation of a Reserve
Fund,68 and designates an organ responsible for allocation and in-
vestment of the funds.69 The following graphic, Figure 1, illustrates
the great strides Spain has made in terms of creating and investing
in a reserve fund, which was virtually nonexistent prior to the year
2000.70
62 Id. art. 7 (providing reduced contribution schemes for those who choose
that route and penalizing those who retire before sixty-five by decreasing their
pension by 7 to 8% for each year of early retirement).
63 Structural employment, characterized by emergence from a fascist dicta-
torship, strength of works councils and trade unions, and strong employment pro-
tection that reduced employers' willingness to hire, has historically contributed to
Spain's previously high unemployment rate of 20%. Factors that contributed to
such high rates have been reduced. See Patrick A. Puhani, A Note on Changes in the
Earnings and Unemployment Structures in Spain: Evidence from the Luxembourg In-
come Study, 50 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 299, 299 (2004) (discussing structural explana-
tions for Spain's unique unemployment experience).
64 See, e.g., Proposici6n de ley 122/000124 (B.O.E. 2004, 141-1) (exemplifying
the Izquierda Unida party's disagreement regarding conditions of recent social
security legislation due to their effect of delaying retirement and the implications
this could have on certain social classes).
65 Ley 24/1997, art. 1.
66 Ley 28/2003 reguladora del Fondo de Reserva de la Seguridad Social
(B.O.E. 2003, 234).
67 Id. arts. 1-3.
68 See id. art. 4 (reserving the funds solely for payment of contributory pen-
sions, solely in the case of deficit).
69 See id. art. 6 (creating the Management Committee of the Reserve Fund).
70 MINISTERIO DE TRABAJO Y AsuNTos SOCIALES, SECRETARIA DE ESTADO DE LA
SEGURIDAD SOCIAL, FONDO DE RESERVA DE LA SEGURIDAD SOCIAL: EVOLUCION DEL
A&o 2005 Y SIruACION A 31-12-2005, INFORME A LAS CORTES GENERALES 6 (2006).
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FIGURE 1: GENERAL EVOLUTION OF THE SPANISH RESERVE FUND
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As is very visible, due to a combination of the Toledo Pact, Law
24/1997, and Law 28/2003, the Spanish government has priori-
tized funding the Reserve Fund with remaining social security con-
tributions after all social security payments have been honored. As
in the U.S. system, the funds are invested in various instruments,
predominantly short and long-term treasury bonds.71 The Toledo
Pact expired in 2003, but it was subsequently renewed.72 The goals
of the Pact remain the same: prioritizing the separation of funds
and their investment in a Reserve Fund, simplification of social se-
curity benefit calculations, and reduction of fraud.
A notable difference between Spain and the United States is
that, on average, the United States requires about twice the number
of years of contribution for pension benefits.73 Thus, one answer
71 Id. at 38.
72 Aprobaci6n del Informe de la Comisi6n no permanente del Pacto de Tole-
do (B.O.E. 2003, 596) (containing the text of the 2003 Toledo Pact renewal) [Ap-
proval of the Report of the Nonpermanent Commission of the Pact of Toledo].
73 Compare Social Security Online, supra note 26 (providing the calculations of
future Social Security benefits based on tax payments), with text accompanying
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for increasing the social security fund is for Spain to increase the
number of contribution years required. From an equitable stand-
point, public acceptance of reform will be greater if increasing the
number of contribution years correlates with an increase in pen-
sion benefits. Spain could consider adopting an approach toward
increasing the number of mandatory contribution years with a
smaller increase in benefits per each extra year of contribution.
The goal of such reform would be to increase the contributory
pool, while only slightly increasing the amount of distributed
benefits.
Spain has recently focused on increasing the contributory pool
via increased contributors, in the form of immigrants, rather than
increasing the periods and amounts of contribution by each con-
tributing individual. Spain has been able to follow such an ap-
proach due to its currently vibrant and growing economy. 74 The
question remains as to whether increasing the number of contribu-
tors solves the problem. As explored in Section 3, the answer
greatly depends on whether age gaps between the working and re-
tiring population are adequate to smooth any demographic shocks
inherent in the current intergenerational funding system.
3. UNITED STATES VERSUS SPAIN: STRATEGICALLY PLANNED
IMMIGRATION COMPARED TO A LAISSEZ FAIRE, SPONTANEOUS
MODEL
75
Although national governments may in theory restrict all im-
migration, in practice this is both unfeasible and undesirable. 76
Ley 24/1997, supra note 60 (providing for the consolidation and rationalization of
the Social Security System).
74 See, e.g., El Ibex traspasa la frontera de los 14.500 y marca otro mdximo, EL
MUNDO, Jan. 24, 2007, available at http://www.elmundo.es/mundodinero/2007/
01/24/mercadoslosquemas/1169659396.html [hereinafter IBEX] (highlighting
the fact that IBEX, Spain's most widely used market index, has continuously
reached historical record highs, even at the beginning of 2007).
75 The complexity of immigration strategy and its inadequate handling has
been described as resulting from a series of "spontaneous" reactions. For more
information on the use of this term, see SARAH COLLINSON, BEYOND BORDERS: WEST
EUROPEAN MIGRATION POLIcY TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY 88 (Royal Inst. of Acad.
Aff. 1993), which proposes the idea that immigration policies in Western Europe
"have emerged as a series of 'knee-jerk' reactions to problems as they arise, and
have generally taken the form of direct enforcement mechanisms, as opposed to
strategies designed to manage the broader causes and consequences."
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Similarly, absence of any immigration legislation and a pure open
door policy is unsustainable. In fact, immigration legislation
should reflect a country's understanding that immigration can be a
double-edged sword: the right amount may be an economic and
cultural blessing, while too much or too little can lead to social, po-
litical, and economic unrest.77
The United States has adhered to the notion that national gov-
ernments have the right to decide which and how many non-
nationals can enter, stay, and work in their territories. 78 The fol-
lowing subsections contend that the United States' approach to
immigration has been more strategically planned than that of
Spain. On the one hand, the United States has mainly aimed to
approach immigration proactively. On the other hand, Spain has
often treated immigration retroactively and spontaneously.
3.1. The United States' Strategic Approach
Established over 200 years ago, U.S. immigration laws have
changed and evolved along with economic and political events.79
Congress, with the concurrence of the President, determines basic
76 See Francesco Magris & Guiseppe Russo, Selective Immigration Policies, Hu-
man Capital Accumulation and Migration Duration in Infinite Horizon 22-23 (Paris
Jourdan Sciences Economiques Working Paper No. 2005-26, 2005) (hypothesizing
that closed door policies may backfire due to family reunification plans and other
factors).
77 See Dusan Drbohlav, Migration Policy Objectives for European East-West In-
ternational Migration, 35 INT'L MIGRATION 85, 86-87 (1997) (citing the example of
several Western European countries that attracted immigrants during the 1960s
and 1970s and benefited from their presence due to a prior lack of manpower, but
that now advocate for immigration restrictions due to increasing views of immi-
gration as a threat to their economies).
78 See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) ("It is an
accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power,
as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the en-
trance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and
upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.").
79 See Gordon H. Hanson, Challenges for US Immigration Policy, in THE UNITED
STATES AND THE WORLD ECONOMY: FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE NEXT
DECADE 344-45 (C. Fred Bergsten ed. 2005) (noting that before the 1920s the only
restraint on U.S. immigration was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1892, which
banned immigration from China but that with the passage of time, came more
regulation such as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and the Hart-
Celler Immigration Bill of 1965).
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immigration law.80 In turn, federal law, based on the commerce
power, confers upon the Attorney General the responsibility of
admitting, regulating, and expelling aliens.81
Socioeconomic and political events in the world have histori-
cally triggered immigration to the United States. The Irish Potato
Famine of 1845-1850, Russian pogroms during the nineteenth cen-
tury, the two World Wars, and Vietnam in the 1970s are only a few
examples of the events that have sparked increased immigration.
United States lawmakers have generally been effective in at least
one regard: flexibility. Flexibility and proactive responses tend to
predominate throughout U.S. immigration legislation. Though in
hindsight certain parts of legislation may be scrutinized, there is
nonetheless a multitude of examples defending the proactive na-
ture of the United States' immigration legislation approach: (1) the
Bracero Program of 1943 allowed temporary entrance of Mexican
workers in response to increased labor demand;8 2 (2) the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948 allowed many people displaced by the War to
enter the United States;8 3 (3) the Internal Security Act of 1950 re-
acted to security concerns and barred entrance of those engaged in
Communist activity; 84 (4) the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 reorganized previous immigration legislation while providing
for quotas and other measures to control immigration;85 and (5) the
Patriot Act, in response to concerns about national security, in-
creased the level of scrutiny used in allowing immigrants to enter
the United States. 86 In addition, due to changing labor demands,
80 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3-4 (granting Congress the power to set im-
migration law through the commerce power by stating that Congress may "regu-
late commerce with foreign nations" and "establish a uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
tion").
81 Id.
82 Agreement between the United States of America and Mexico revising the
agreement of August 4, 1942 respecting the temporary migration of Mexican agri-
cultural workers, U.S.-Mex., Apr. 26, 1943, 57 Stat. 1152.
83 Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), amended by Immigration
and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
84 Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (codi-
fied as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 831-32, 834-35 (2000)).
85 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
86 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001,
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from the industrial revolution to the software development age,
the United States has persistently pursued "brain drain" policies to
attract the most skilled workers from developing countries.87
These are only a few of the many examples that prove United
States immigration legislation has been prompt in responding to
economic and political factors.
Interestingly, the United States shares a common geographical
trait with Spain. Both countries have southern neighbors charac-
terized by poorer economies and significant populations that wish
to migrate north. For the United States, similar to Spain, many il-
legal immigrants enter through the southern border.88 The United
States has continuously tackled this issue. For example, the 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) prohibited the em-
ployment of illegal aliens while simultaneously offering amnesty
to those illegal aliens residing in the country prior to 1982.89 The
following decade, Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1990
that increased the annual quota of legal immigrants to be admitted
into the United States and liberalized provisions in certain non-
immigrant visa categories (such as the H-1B).90 Congress passed
the 1990 Act based on concerns of skilled work shortage in the
United States.91 Again, this conforms to the aforementioned proac-
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
87 The "brain drain" refers to policies adopted by the United States and other
developed countries to attract the migration of the most skilled workers from de-
veloping countries. Policies such as the H-1B visa program give skilled profes-
sionals preference in terms of waiting time and visa treatment with respect to en-
tering the United States. Likewise, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom
count worker skills toward the points needed by immigrants to gain immigration
to these countries. See, F.H. Buckley, The Political Economy of Immigration Policies,
16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 81 (1996) (arguing that the United States should emulate
Canada's immigration screening programs in order to widen its doors to valuable
immigrants and close them to value-decreasing ones).
88 See LUKE J. LARSEN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN BORN POPULATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 1 [hereinafter FOREIGN BORN 2003] (indicating that out
of the 35.5 million U.S. immigrants that were born in a foreign country in 2003,
53.3% proceeded from Latin America).
89 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, §§ 101, 201, Pub. L. No. 99-
603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
90 See generally Miguel Lawson & Marianne Grin, Recent Development, The
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 255
(1992) (summarizing the main provisions of the Immigration Act).
91 See id.
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tive "brain-drain" approach. More recently, after September 11th
the common policy has returned to one of selectivity and restric-
tion.92 Given this increased scrutiny, the United States has exerted
its right to control its borders and the entry of aliens.93 Over time,
immigration legislation has evolved to match changes in economic
events. In brief, the U.S. multifaceted model contrasts sharply with
Spain's more delayed, spontaneous immigration legislation model.
3.2. EU Legislation and Spain's Spontaneous Approach
3.2.1. Immigration in the EU Context
The 1957 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic
Community to "lay the foundations of an even closer union among
the peoples of Europe." 94 Subsequently, the Single European Act
of 1986 encouraged monetary, economic, and foreign coordina-
tion.95 Ultimately, the vision was to create a Europe without inside
borders, a Europe where goods, services, capital, and people
flowed freely from one member country to another.
96
Integration was brought to an unprecedented level with the
Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which reformed the European Economic
Community into the European Community.97 As suggested by the
92 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act (providing more leeway through looser bur-
dens for investigative agencies when tracking individuals); Peter Andreas, A Tale
of Two Borders: The U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada Lines After 9-11, at 6 (Univ. of Cal.,
San Diego, Ctr. for Comparative Immigration Studies, Working Paper No. 77,
2003) (explaining that even the U.S.-Canada border, which has historically been
characterized by lax immigration controls, has been subject to increased scrutiny
post-9/11); see also Douglas S. Massey, International Migration at the Dawn of the
Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State, 25 POPULATION & DEv. REV. 303, 316-17
(1999) (alleging that increased scrutiny with respect to inunigration in the United
States dates back to 1986 when immigrants' rights and benefits began to be cur-
tailed).
93 See Massey, supra note 92.
94 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
95 Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 29.
96 See Terri Givens & Adam Luedtke, The Politics of European Union Immigra-
tion Policy: Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization, 32 POL'Y STUD. J. 145, 145 (2004)
("One of the 1986 Single European Act's 'four freedoms' of movement (along with
goods, services, and capital) is the free movement of labor.").
97 Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinafter
Maastricht Treaty].
20071
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [Vol. 28:2
reformulation of the Community's name, the Maastricht Treaty in-
volved more than economic integration. The Treaty provided that
every citizen of a Member State would become a citizen of the
European Union, with the goal of further increasing the policy of
an integrated Europe.98 Nevertheless, tensions between border
control and integration continue to render difficult the harmoniza-
tion of immigration laws, especially when dealing with immigra-
tion from developing countries.99 These factors, combined with
different geographical situations, historical interactions, and politi-
cal interests, complicate the possibility of a solid EU immigration
law. 00
In May 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam signified a step forward
in the creation of a common area of freedom, safety, and justice.O'
The Treaty integrates the Schengen Treaty into the structure of the
EU, with the ultimate effect of eradicating interior borders within
Member States. 102 However, exterior borders remain regulated at
98 Maastricht Treaty tit. II, art. G(C).
99 See Alexander Caviedes, The Open Method of Co-ordination in Immigration
Policy: A Tool for Prying Open Fortress Europe?, 11 J. EuR. PUB. POL'Y 289, 289 (2004)
(explaining that when it comes to immigration regulation with respect to third
world country nationals, legislation remains at the national member-state level).
100 See Dermot Hodson & Imelda Maher, The Open Method as a New Mode of
Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination, 39 J. COMMON MKT. STUD.
719, 721-22 (2001) (stressing the problems of converging toward a common policy
with respect to more sensitive issues such as immigration).
101 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Trea-
ties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2,
1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 (promoting objectives that will "maintain and develop the
Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of
persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to ex-
ternal border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of
crime.").
102 See id. (aiming "to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on
it"); see also Stephen J. Silvia & Aaron Beers Sampson, Acquis Communautaire and
European Exceptionalism: A Genealogy 21 (Am. Consortium on Eur. Stud., Working
Paper No. 2003.1, 2003) (exploring the definition of the acquis communautaire as an
"inherently exclusionary framework, unavoidably divid[ing] the world into the
admitted, the potentially admittable and an inferior non-admittable, non-EU
'other"'). But see Virginie Guiraudon, The Constitution of a European Immigration
Policy Domain: A Political Sociology Approach, 10 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 263, 264 (2003)
(explaining that one of the main worries with the Schengen Agreement was "that
free movement within the EC required compensatory measures at the external
borders lest Europe become a 'sieve'.").
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the national level. In theory, the Treaty of Amsterdam creates the
Common Foreign and Security Policy to regulate the EU's security
and borders. Nonetheless, despite agreements on coordinating
policies at the EU level, most European immigration laws remain
localized under each member state. 03 This is particularly true for
immigration from non-EU countries.104 As such, the remaining
subsections concentrate on Spain's national immigration policies.
3.2.2. Immigration at the National Level
In 1985, only a few months prior to entering the EU, Spain
passed its first immigration law.105 The 1985 Immigration Law was
criticized from various fronts. 06 The Izquierda Unida political
party and immigrant advocates labeled it as vague.10 7 Scholars
designated it as a tool to make Spain the southern wall of "Fortress
Europe."108 The Constitutional Court challenged the law due to its
103 See CALAVITA, supra note 12, at 4 (demonstrating that despite the Treaty of
Masstricht and the Schengen Agreement's provisions for free movement of EU
citizens, immigration from non-EU countries is still very much conducted at the
local level).
104 Id.
105 Article 13 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 mandates that foreigners in
Spain shall enjoy the public freedoms which this title and the law guarantee. C.E.,
art. 13. See also 17 GISBERT H. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD: SPAIN (2003) (providing an English language version of the Spanish Con-
stitution). As a result, Law 7/1985 was passed to enhance the rights and freedoms
of foreigners in Spain. Previously, the only law on foreigners' rights dated back to
the Royal Decree of November 17, 1852.
106 See Univ. of Barcelona Group, The Reforms of Immigration Law (1985-2005)
and the Equality of Rights, in CHALLENGE: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF EUROPEAN
LIBERTY AND SECURITY 17 (2005) [hereinafter Reforms of Immigration Law] (describ-
ing the name of the law as indicative of its restrictiveness since it connotes Spain's
position as one of a police agent rather than an immigration agent with respect to
incoming foreigners).
107 From the 1985 law to the new developments in the 2004 reforms,
Izquierda Unida remains consistent in believing the Spanish immigration law is
vague, restrictive, and does not promote integration. See Diarios de Sesiones del
Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno y Diputaci6n Permanente, VII Legislatura, July
8, 2003, No. 267, at 13,968-88 (proposing an alternative to the 2003 Law and com-
menting on the deficiencies of immigration law dating back to 1985).
108 See generally Patrick R. Ireland, Facing the True 'Fortress Europe': Immigrant
and Politics in the EC, 29 J. COMMON MKT. STUDS. 457, 460 (1991) (discussing the no-
tion of "Fortress Europe" by explaining that as the walls between member-states
fall, the exterior walls may grow larger because since there is no concrete defini-
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effect of depriving undocumented individuals of the rights of asso-
ciation, congregation, manifestation, and the liberty to unionize
and strike. 09 Indeed, the legislation had a very restrictive charac-
ter, with strong emphasis placed on the issue of border control." 0
Spain's economic and cultural internationalization correlates
heavily with its entrance into the European Community in 1986.111
In search of milder winters at an affordable price, pensioners from
EU Member States were among the first to enter Spain's doors.
112
Over time, Spain's internationalization acquired a more expansive
character. Current immigration waves arrive from many non-EU
countries 13 and share a common need for employment.114 As a re-
sult of increased immigration at the turn of the century, Spain
passed two new immigration regulations and adopted the Greco
Program for integration.
115
tion of "European," Europeans can only define themselves as to what is not
"European").
109 See STC, July 7, 1987 (B.O.E., No. 115) (voiding several restrictions of the
Organic Law 7/1985, including annulment of limitations relating to limitations in
the rights to assemble and voiding the prohibition placed on judges to suspend
administrative decisions with respect to immigration); see also Reforms of Immigra-
tion Law, supra note 106, at 18-20 (summarizing the multiple Constitutional Court
cases that 'liberalized' the restrictive 1985 law).
110 See Reforms of Immigration Law, supra note 106, at 17-20 (summarizing the
characteristics of the 1985 law).
111 See Martha Peach, Globalization of Education in Spain: From Isolation to Inter-
nationalization to Globalization, 26 HIGHER EDUC. EuR. 69, 70 (2001) ("Among the ele-
ments in the history of Spain that have reduced the effect of the authoritarian and
isolationist state has been.., the entry into the European Union in 1986 ....").
112 See, e.g., HARRY KING, GOING TO LIVE IN SPAIN 10 (2003) (alluding to climate
as one of the reasons that British started immigrating to Spain).
113 See BOLETIN ECONOMICO, supra note 11, at 42 (providing that about 77.9%
of all foreign born residents in Spain proceed from non-EU countries).
114 See, e.g., M.J. Alvarez, Mds de 200.000 inmigrantes tienen contratos indefinidos
en la regi6n, ABC, Jan. 19, 2006, at 36-37 (indicating that the immigrants immigrat-
ing to Spain do so in search of a job).
115 See MINISTERIO DE TRABAJO Y AsUNTOS SOCIALES, ANUARIO DE MIGRACIONES
2002 [MIGRATION YEARBOOK 2002], at 336 (providing statistics and analysis of the
evolution of immigration in Spain). Based on the territorial organization of Spain,
and its political and administrative decentralization, the Greco Program acknowl-
edges the vital role that regional governments will play in integrating the immi-
grant population. Law 4/2000 and the Greco Program are both explicit in their
recognition that it is the development and implementation of integration policies
at the local level that will have the greatest impact on integration. The Greco Pro-
gram has four main goals: (1) global, coordinated design of immigration as a de-
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The first of the two new regulations was Law 4/2000 on the
Rights and Freedom of Foreigners in Spain and their Integration.
Law 4/2000 laid down more rights for resident aliens and immi-
grants in irregular" 6 conditions than did the 1985 Law. 117 As its
name indicates, Law 4/2000 marked an attempt to transition from
a policy of being the southern wall of "Fortress Europe" to a policy
of integration. Among the most significant changes implemented
by Law 4/2000 is the concept known in Spain as arraigo ("to take
root"). This concept validates the possibility of an irregular immi-
grant becoming a legal immigrant after an extended stay in the
country." 8 An irregular immigrant can gain regular immigrant
status by two routes. The first route is called arraigo laboral and re-
quires the immigrant to have stayed irregularly in Spain for a
minimum of two years and to be able to prove that an employer
has contracted him (illegally) for at least one year. The second
route is called arraigo social and requires the immigrant to have
stayed in Spain for at least three years irregularly and have a labor
contract proposal as well as either a proven relationship with resi-
dent family members or a certificate of favorable social integration
issued by a local government.
Upon satisfying the requirements for either route, the immi-
grant will be entitled to a temporary residence permit. However,
sirable phenomenon for Spain, (2) integration of foreign residents and their fami-
lies as active contributors to the growth of Spain, (3) admission regulation to en-
sure peaceful coexistence within Spanish society, and (4) maintenance of protec-
tion for refugees and asylum seekers.
116 See Grete Brochmann, The Mechanisms of Control, in MECHANISMS OF
IMMIGRATION CONTROL: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN REGULATION
POLICIES 1, 7 (Grete Brochmann & Tomas Hammar eds., 1999) [hereinafter
IMMIGRATION CONTROL] ("Immigration may be legal!regular if all permits are in
order, or illegal! irregular if some or all permits are missing. The latter type in-
cludes those who have entered illegally, those who have overstayed a legal period
and those who work without permission.").
117 Ley Orgdnica sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en Espafha y
su integraci6n social [Organic Law on the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in
Spain and Their Social Integration] (B.O.E. 2000, 544). Organic Law 4/2000 of
January 11 establishes: the freedom to meet and demonstrate; the freedom of as-
sociation; the freedom to strike and join a trade union; the right to the same edu-
cation as Spanish people; the right of all aliens, whatever their legal situation may
be, to emergency public health care; and the right to assistance of a lawyer at pro-
ceedings concerning refusal to permit entry or expulsion or obligatory departure
from Spanish territory and all proceedings regarding asylum.
118 Id.
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such a system explicitly acknowledges the possibility of securing
regular immigrant status merely by having stayed sufficiently long
in the country by irregular means. As such, the law recognizes and
provides incentives for irregular immigration. Moreover, unlike
laws in many other countries, Law 4/2000 provides irregular im-
migrants with explicit and unconditional rights to long-term health
and education, thereby facilitating irregular immigration. In other
countries, long-term provision of services such as healthcare and
education will be granted only if a residence permit decision is
pending or in cases of urgency.119 In sum, Law 4/2000 was a dras-
tic change to the previous 1985 Immigration Law.
Less than six months after Law 4/2000, the Popular Party
amended the law with Law 8/2000.120 The net effect was a close
regression to the 1985 Law in terms of toughening up the conse-
quences of irregularity -the law provided irregular residence and
irregular work as sufficient reason for expulsion.121 However, near
the end of 2004, the legislature acknowledged that immigration
had become one of the greatest national concerns and passed a
new amendment, Royal Decree 2393/2004,122 which introduced
modifications that favor legal immigration while trying to mini-
119 For example, recognizing that many countries do not provide long-term
health and education, Article 28 of the International Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families states: "Mi-
grant workers and members of their families shall have the right to receive any
medical care that is urgently required for the preservation of their life or the avoid-
ance of irreparable harm .... G.A. Res. 45/158, at 266, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158
(Dec. 18, 1990) (emphasis added). Logically, to the extent that Spain provides
more services to irregular immigrants than neighboring countries, Spain will re-
ceive more irregular immigrants. In turn, this complicates the ability of ade-
quately obtaining social security contributions from illegally employed immi-
grants.
120 Ley Organica de reforma de la Ley Organica sobre derechos y libertades
de los extranjeros en Espana y su integracion social (B.O.E. 2000, 2366) [Amending
the Organic Law on the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain and Their So-
cial Integration]
121 See, e.g., David Corkill, Economic Migrants and the Labour Market in Spain
and Portugal, 24 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 828, 838 (2001) [hereinafter Economic Mi-
grants in Spain] (explaining that the law allowed greater flexibility in expelling il-
legal immigrants and cut back on immigrants' rights, partly founded on fears that
providing too many benefits would be fiscally unsound).
122 Real Decreto por el que se apruba el Reglamento de la Ley Organica sobre
derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en Espana y su integracion social (B.O.E.
2005, 323) [Royal Decree Approving the Regulation of the Organic Law].
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mize illegal immigration. 123 Many aspects of 4/2000 were re-
implemented. Most notably, a key provision of the Decree allows
the government to hold regularization processes 24 A typical regu-
larization process involves several steps. First, an illegal imnui-
grant has to charge his employer with illegal hiring of an undocu-
mented worker.125 Second, the employer would have to face all
retroactive sanctions and fines unless he agrees to employ the im-
migrant for at least one more year and clears any pending obliga-
tions due to the employee. 26 Third, the immigrant has to submit
his criminal record for Spain and his country of origin along with a
previous employment contract with at least six months of dura-
tion127 After examination of the papers and approval, the em-
ployer has to subscribe the immigrant to the social security system
as an employee with a temporary work permit. A month later, the
immigrant will officially be recognized as a legal immigrant affili-
ated with Social Security. 128
Despite marking progression in Spain's previous restrictive
immigration policy, the retroactive nature of over-reliance on am-
nesty periods and regularization processes has side effects. Bap-
tized as efecto liamada, the "call effect" produced by over-reliance
on amnesty periods results in downplaying the importance of ar-
riving to a country as a legal immigrant. Table 1 below provides
estimates of the number of irregular 129 immigrants that have ar-
rived in Spain during the past couple decades:130
123 Id.
124 Such a procedure took place during the three month period from February
to May 2005. However, amnesty periods are not a novelty in Spain. See Economic
Migrants in Spain, supra note 121, at 840 (describing the previous four amnesty pe-
riods undertaken in Spain); see also BOLETIN ECONOMICO, supra note 11, at 41 (ex-
plaining the required procedure mandated for the regularization of illegal immi-
grants during the amnesty period).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 This Comment uses the terms illegal immigrant and irregular immigrant
interchangeably.
130 INsTrTuTo NACIONAL DE ESTADISTICA (National Statistics Institute),
http://www.ine.es/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2007) (displaying data used to create Ta-
ble 1). Between 1971 and 1991, the volume of immigrants represented about 1.1 to
2.2% of the total population. The 1997 to 2005 period marks the most growth for
immigration to Spain. In less than a decade, Spain has situated itself parallel to
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TABLE 1: SPAIN'S ESTIMATED POPULATION (1971 - 2005)
Year Total Total Estimated Irregular Immi-
Population Immigrants ants out of Total Immigrants
1971 34,117,623 365,376 34,795
1981 37,723,299 625,907 49,660
1991 38,846,823 719,647 71,366
1997 39,852,651 840,594 27,272
2000 40,499,791 1,109,060 474,947
2001 41,116,842 1,181,085 868,884
2002 41,837,894 2,109,087 1,340,167
2003 42,717,064 2,672,596 1,387,315
2004 43,197,684 3,034,326 1,714,256
2005 44,108,530 4,130,610 1,037,973
The high percentage of irregular immigrants as part of the
overall immigrant population could very well be explained by the
efecto liamada theory. Efecto llamada characterizes legislation that
decreases a country's ability to control immigration inflows be-
cause an immigrant will be under the idea that once he enters, it
will be a matter of time before he is legalized. The result of such a
policy is the encouragement of illegal, unsystematic immigration.
In other words, the government will lose much of its ability to con-
trol the aspects of immigration to its country. Indeed, such was the
case Spanish authorities confronted near their southern border in
September and October 2005.131 If Spain downplays the impor-
tance of arriving with legalized status, immigrants will naturally
traditional immigration receiving countries such as France and Germany. How-
ever, as compared to France and Germany, Spain has been characterized by a sub-
stantial number of irregular immigrants. This is of particular concern for this
Comment's analysis because irregular immigrants in Spain will not contribute to
social security contributions but they are entitled to continuous education and
health care without question as to their irregular status. Id.
131 See, e.g., World Briefing Africa: Migrants Storm and Enter Spanish Enclave,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A4 ("About 650 African migrants charged razor-wire
border fences around Spain's other enclave of Melilla in Morocco.... It was the
fourth mass attempt since last week by sub-Saharan Africans trying to make their
way to Europe to enter Melilla or Spain's other North African enclave, Ceuta...
."); Renwick McLean, 5 Killed in Mass Attempt to Cross From Morocco to Spanish En-
clave, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 29, 2005, at Al (informing about the death of 5 migrants
and injury of 100 others while trying to enter Spain by way of Ceuta).
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select Spain as their country of entry, rather than neighboring
countries with more restrictive policies. Aside from other eco-
nomic and social implications, such a spontaneous approach pre-
vents Spain from strategically determining the number, age, and
skill set of its immigrants-all important factors for a country
wishing to use immigration as a source for increased social security
trust fund contributions.
When reacting to the efecto llamada, Spanish policymakers must
realize that a sharp reduction in the flow of irregular immigration
would pose a rather severe threat to the Spanish economy, which
has been rooted in an almost unlimited supply of foreign labor for
the past decade. To effectively reduce irregular immigration, a
government must introduce negative incentives for irregular im-
migration. However, reducing irregular immigration also requires
considering new ways for treating regular immigration to offset
the shortfall in the supply of irregular foreign labor. If Spain does
not compensate for an irregular immigration shortfall, its economy
might have to operate below its potential, with reduced economic
growth as the major implication. Therefore, the answer from a
lawmaking standpoint is to create a cohesive, pro-legal immigra-
tion policy which will gradually give the Spanish government
more flexibility in determining the characteristics of its immigra-
tion while simultaneously allowing the maximization of any posi-
tive effect that immigrants may have in funding the social security
reserve fund.
4. IMMIGRATION'S IMPACT ON SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDING: A
SHORT-TERM OR LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE FUNDING
CONUNDRUM?
4.1. U.S. Immigration's Impact on Social Security
Regardless of immigrants' contributions to social security, they
too will age and become beneficiaries. Thus, unless most immi-
grants come from younger age groups, immigration may not offset
the baby boomer shock's effect on the trust fund.132 Even then, re-
132 See Joel Feinleib & David Warner, The Impact of Immigration on Social Secu-
rity and the National Economy 3 (Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., Issue Brief No. 1, 2005) ("A
2004 memo from the Office of the Chief Actuary pointed out that the change in
the actuarial balance of the Social Security Trust Fund from an increase in immi-
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member that as a result of the intergenerational nature of the sys-
tem, a one-time wave of young immigrants would eventually have
a demographic effect comparable to the pending baby boomer re-
tirement effect. Evidence suggests that immigrants tend to arrive
in the United States slightly later in their productive years.133 This
supports the proposition that the dependency ratio may slightly
decrease because of immigration but that the decrease may not
counter the baby boomer retirement effect. Moreover, there are
two additional reasons why immigration alone will not solve social
security funding concerns in the United States. First, the AIME
formula discussed in Section 2.1 has a subsidy built into it that will
tend to favor immigrants. Second, as the 2006 Annual Trustees'
Report indicates, there simply is no determinative factor in estimat-
ing social security projections.
The U.S. Social Security system, similar to Spain's system, in-
cludes a formula aimed at providing a subsidy to a given class of
families under a certain threshold characterized by overall lower
lifetime earnings. Recent empirical evidence analyzing the effect of
immigration on U.S. social security funding is scarce. However,
one of the leading studies by National Bureau of Economic Re-
search analysts Gustman and Steinmeier has found that "the in-
come support feature of social security disproportionately transfers
benefits to immigrants relative to U.S. born with identical earn-
ings." 134 The reason for this result is explained by the method of
calculating benefits. Even if he earned the same level of income as
a U.S. citizen, the immigrant who did not spend his entire lifetime
working in the United States will generally benefit more from the
formula, which currently provides subsidies to those who have
had years in which they did not receive income.135 In sum, the dif-
ference between taxes paid and benefits received will generally be
larger for the native-born population than for the immigrant co-
gration of about 250,000 per year would be ... about 5 percent of the currently
projected actuarial deficit.").
133 See FOREIGN BORN 2003, supra note 88, at 3 (indicating that 45.1% of the for-
eign-born population were in the 25 to 44 age group while the 30 to 34 age group
comprised the highest percentage).
134 Alan L. Gustman & Thomas L. Steinmeier, Social Security Benefits of Immi-
grants and U.S. Born 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6478,
1998).
135 Id. at 1-2.
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hort, even when the earnings for the two groups are identical every
year.1
36
In addition to Gustman and Steinmeier's studies on the limita-
tions of immigration as a funding source, the 2006 Annual Report
illustrates that it would be erroneous to hope that a single factor,
such as immigration, will cure social security financing concerns.
The 2006 Annual Report indicates an abundance of factors affect-
ing social security funds: future birth rates, death rates, immigra-
tion, marriage and divorce rates, retirement-age patterns, disability
incidence and termination rates, productivity gains, wage in-
creases, inflation, and many other demographic and economic fac-
tors.137 From the list, it seems that immigration, productivity gains,
or wage increases may be somewhat easier to control than death
rates, marriage/ divorce rates, and other demographic factors. Leg-
islative decisions determine the pattern of immigration. This
means the future is easier to predict if there is cooperation between
legislators and social security actuaries. On the other hand, the fu-
ture is uncertain if there is no cooperation between these parties.
However, the bottom line is that in the U.S. experience there is no
single factor decisive in increasing the social security fund.
4.2. Spain's Immigration Politics and Social Security
The U.S. experience only provides partial support for the idea
that increased immigration can offset social security under-
funding.138 As a result, Spain should consider that immigration
alone may not counter the inherent intergenerational susceptibili-
ties of its social security system. The increased number of imi-
grants that have actively infiltrated Spain's social security system
as a result of the amnesty period translates into a higher level of
contributions in the short-term.139 However, in the long term, an
136 Id. at 2.
137 2006 ANNUAL TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 25, at 6.
138 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, UNDERSTANDING
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: THE ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 11 (2005) [hereinafter
ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES] (indicating that young legal immigrants can be benefi-
cial because they contribute to the social security system longer). But see id. at 5
(forecasting that the rate of social security returns will likely decrease over time).
139 See, e.g., Marcela Sanchez, Spain's Immigration Experiment Worth Watching,
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 13, 2005, at A21 (highlighting that the Spanish govern-
ment foresees a three percent increase in social security collections as a result of
the 2005 amnesty period); see also Los inmigrantes regularizados aportardn 1.500 mi-
20071
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
increase of system affiliates translates into increased pressure on
the system because more affiliates incur more of everything -more
income, but also more costs and expenses. 40 As previously dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.4, immigrants in Spain are highly concen-
trated in construction, agricultural, and domestic sectors, which
have a lower contribution requirement.141 Considering these and
other factors, a Banco de Espafia (Bank of Spain) analysis predicts
that persistent arrival of immigrants will not solve the accounting
problem for pension schemes. 42 In spite of the present immigra-
tion waves, the dependency ratio is forecasted to continue increas-
ing.143
One of the answers as to why the dependency ratio is expected
to continue increasing is because the new arrivals have not signifi-
cantly affected the demography of the country's age structure. The
figure below indicates demographic trends, as of 2005, of the recent
immigration. 44
Hones a la Seguridad Social en un afio, EL MUNDO, May 9, 2005, at 20 (quoting Jesis
Caldera, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, with respect to his previsions that
regulation during the 2005 amnesty period will result in an increase of 1,000 to
1,500 euros for the social security fund).
140 BOLETN EcONOMICO, supra note 11 (acknowledging that regularizing im-
migrants increases returns and costs of social security).
141 Economic Migrants in Spain, supra note 121, at 829 ("Native workers are
unwilling to do the more menial tasks or accept low wages and poor working
conditions. As a result, immigrant workers tend to cluster in the sectors that
Spaniards shun, notably construction, domestic service and catering.").
142 Immigration did not alter the long-term predicted trajectory of the rate of
dependency, even if the arrival of immigrants reaches levels as high as those pro-
jected by INE. This is due to several factors. First, a heavy immigrant population
now will also result in a population segment in 20 to 40 years that will face the
same problem. Second, Banco de Espafia projects that by 2015, the life expectancy
rate will be at 82.4 years. This reflects an expected increase in the life expectancy
of about 3 years higher than the 2004 figure of 79.4. BOLETiN ECONOMIcO, supra
note 11.
143 Id. at 47 (projecting that the dependency ratio will accelerate from 25% up
to 56.1% even in presence of generous immigration arrivals).
144 See generally INSTTUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADiSTICA [National Statistics Insti-
tute] http://www.ine.es/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2007) (displaying data used to create
Table 2).
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TABLE 2: PRINCIPAL FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BY AGE (%) AS 2005
Age Ranges
Nationality 0-19 20 - 29 30 - 39 40 -49 50+
Morocco 24.4 29.6 27.5 12.7 5.8
Ecuador 25.1 30.3 26.7 12.7 5.1
Romania 18 36.9 27.9 12.4 4.7
Colombia 20.9 25.1 29.5 16.6 7.8
United Kingdom 13.4 6 13.3 14.7 52.6
Argentina 21.2 24.9 24.6 13.6 15.6
Germany 9.9 8.5 15.6 15.7 50.3
Bolivia 17.7 36.6 28.6 12.8 4.3
Italy 15 21.7 26.9 15.8 20.6
Bulgaria 17.6 27.5 27.4 18.3 9.2
China 24.8 24.8 28.1 16.3 6.1
Peru 14.4 24.8 30.8 17.7 12.4
France 14.8 17.5 25.1 15.1 27.6
Portugal 15.4 21.1 24.9 20.7 18.1
Ukraine 13.6 23.1 29.8 24.1 9.5
Dominican Republic 26.7 24.1 26.6 14 8.6
Total 19.1 25.7 26.3 14.5 14.3
These immigration statistics illustrate that there is not any dis-
proportionately represented age group among the arriving immi-
grant population. Thus, from a purely demographic standpoint,
the migrations may neither positively nor negatively affect any po-
tential demographic shocks to the reserve fund. Aged immigrants,
primarily from the U.K. and Germany, who surpass the fifty-year-
old benchmark, most likely represent the previously discussed re-
tirement group seeking better climates. On the other hand, there is
a rather young immigrant population from Morocco, Ecuador,
Peru, and China. However, about half of the overall immigrant
population is between twenty and forty years old. This should
mean that most immigrants have completed their formative educa-
tion, where applicable, and are at full working potential. Since ar-
rivals are proportionately spread through the different age ranges,
the arrivals are not likely to alter the current and pending baby
boomer effect on the social security reserve fund.
Long run sustainability of the social security system will re-
quire more than immigration and a growing economy. As the
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United States case study illustrates, immigration may have proven
to be helpful, but not decisive. As long as an economy is growing
and has use for immigrant labor, immigration will have the even-
tual effect of increasing social security contributions. However,
Spain's social security system will also require internal legislative
reform in order to achieve the highest possible level of immunity
from demographic shocks.
5. REFORM: EVOLVING FROM SPONTANEOUS TO PROACTIVE
RESPONSES
5.1. A Cohesive Approach to Immigration and Social Security
U.S. immigration legislation, as previously discussed, is charac-
terized by its proactive nature. Even if immigration is not the
complete answer to cushioning demographic effects in an inter-
generational social security system, the United States has aimed to
maximize the benefits of immigration through proactive legisla-
tion. Spain should follow suit. This move will require Spanish leg-
islators to abandon their current spontaneous approach to immi-
gration law. Before passing new laws, legislators should consider
how Spain's current economy, immigration policy, and social secu-
rity system interact with each other, and only afterwards should
they envision how new laws would help to maximize the returns
of the current social security system.
As evidenced in previous sections of this Comment, Spain's re-
cent economic outlook has been rather favorable, both in terms of
stock market growth and unemployment rate decline.145 These two
factors have allowed previously nonexistent groups, such as
women, to enter the workforce.146 In the past, the absence of
women from the active labor force led females to rely on widows'
pensions after their spouses deceased. If the female workforce par-
ticipation increases to the point where females can become inde-
pendent of their spouses' pensions, this may produce a favorable
effect in the enlargement of the social security trust fund.
145 See, e.g., IBEX, supra note 74 & accompanying text.
146 See Spain: Demographic and Other Social Trends, THE CLEARINGHOUSE ON
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILD, YOUTH AND FAMILY POLICIES
http://www.childpolicyintl.org/countries/spain.html#demotrends (last visited
Apr. 7, 2007) (describing the rising labor force participation for women in Spain).
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The future of Spain's social security is also inevitably tied to the
future of the country's immigration policies. One drawback is
likely related to Spain's historically restrictive immigration law
and retrospective immigration policy. 147 For example, the con-
straining 1985 immigration law lasted well into the 1990s before
the government finally realized that immigration was not a tempo-
rary phenomenon.148 Spain's historic role as a sending country to
the Americas, Africa, and northern Europe could explain the in-
adequate development of its own immigration law.149 Until re-
cently, immigration policies have failed to encompass demands of
the current situation. This failure can be partly attributed to previ-
ous lack of social or political culture dedicated to addressing the
issue.
Lately there is evidence that Spain is beginning to abandon the
spontaneous, haphazard model. Spain's 1985 Immigration Law
approached immigration as a temporary phenomenon and focused
primarily on external control. 150 Yet, the subsequent amendments
have taken an internal control approach, characterized by provi-
sions for family reunification and more favorable permanent resi-
dence provisions. Further, the creation of the Superior Council on
Immigration Policy 15' and Permanent Observatory for Migration
152
reflects a more focused attempt toward immigration research.
147 Economic Migrants in Spain, supra note 121, at 830 ("Governments through-
out southern Europe were caught off guard by the surge in immigrant numbers
that occurred after the mid-1980s, and responded belatedly to a phenomenon that
northern Europe experienced three decades earlier.").
148 CALAVITA, supra note 12, at 5 (explaining that the 1985 law was "oriented
toward immigration as a contingent or emergency labor supply" and therefore
"contained[ed] few provisions for permanent legal residency or naturalization").
149 See Barbara Schmitter Heisler, Sending Countries and the Politics of Emigra-
tion and Destination, 19 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 469, 478-79 (1985) (explaining that
Spain's history as a sending country dates back to its colonial era).
150 See IMMIGRATION CONTROL, supra note 116, at 9 ("A country's public immi-
gration control refers to the rules and procedures governing selection, admission
and deportation of foreign citizens."). There are two main types of controls. Ex-
ternal controls concern a country's regulation regarding the arrival of foreigners.
Internal controls are used to regulate the initial process from the arrival of immi-
grants all the way to their possible legalization and citizenship. Id.
151 Real Decreto por el que se crea el Consejo Superior de Politica de Inmi-
graci6n (B.O.E. 2001, 344) [Royal Decree Creating the Superior Council on Immi-
gration Policy].
152 Id.
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These advancements must be complemented with more proactive
legislation in the future.
If immigrants are to help counter the potential demographic
shock, Spain must ensure that immigrant arrival does not worsen
the shock. The latter is likely to happen in the absence of proactive
regulation. Realizing that immigration adds both to the working
age population and to the future dependency ratio, Spain should
attempt to achieve immigration flows that cushion demographic
gaps likely to have adverse effects on the intergenerational pension
scheme. After conducting necessary demographic studies, Spain
must consider alternatives. Recruiting younger immigrants may
be helpful in countering the oncoming demographic shock. How-
ever, creating a substantial gap between newcomers and the baby
boomer population may result in future demographic shocks. Im-
plementing and adhering to a quota system, as the United States
has historically done, may reduce the irregular immigrant under-
ground economy from which Spain currently does not collect con-
tributions.
On a less economic and more social level, legislators must con-
sider the integration measures necessary so that new arrivals can
make efficient contributions to the country and so that local groups
will not view immigration as a threat to their well-being.15 3 Ideally,
an effective integration program will ensure adaptation and reduce
fiscal burdens in the form of unemployment, welfare, and social
disruption. If too large, these burdens will counter any possible
benefit of immigration to social security funding. The current re-
sponse that immigration is receiving from many Spanish institu-
tions does not always correspond to principles of solidarity. New-
comers face obstacles in the form of housing,15 4 employment,155 and
153 See BOLETIN ECONOMICO, supra note 11, at 48 (concluding that those coun-
tries characterized by high levels of integration and assimilation benefit the most
from immigrant productivity and contribution to society).
154 See, e.g., Fiorella Dell'Olio, Immigration and Immigrant Policy in Italy and the
UK: Is Housing Policy a Barrier to a Common Approach Towards Immigration in the
EU?, 30 J. ETHNIc & MIGRATION STUD. 107, 118 (2004) (illustrating that in the EU
"'high numbers of undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers'" are the most
likely to use shelters and other services for the homeless).
155 Economic Migrants in Spain, supra note 121, at 836 (describing the exploita-
tion many immigrants face in terms of housing and work conditions).
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social integration.1 56 The sudden incorporation of large arrivals of
immigrants with cultural, ethnic, and religious differences gener-
ates concern about the ability of immigrants and natives to live in
peaceful co-existence. During the last years, several xenophobic
incidents in different cities and villages-El Eijido,
157 Terrassa, s58
and Villaverde,15 9 for example -highlight the need for a higher de-
gree of involvement by public authorities to facilitate the integra-
tion of immigrant populations while maximizing the productivity
of incomers and reducing the development of fiscal burdens.
The challenge faced by the government and the legislature is
multifaceted. Social security funding could benefit from additional
taxpayers. Entrepreneurs demand "cheap, 'flexible'" labor pro-
vided by immigrants. 160 Yet, the recent influx 161 of immigration
could lead society to the verge of a xenophobic backlash. 62 Now,
more than ever, the government needs to address the situation
with proactive and cohesive policies- spontaneous immigration
legislation will not suffice.
156 See Anna Triandafyllidou, The Political Discourse on Immigration in Southern
Europe: A Critical Analysis, 10 J. COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, 379
(2000) (indicating that overall integration in Spain is easier for those arriving from
Latin America due to the historical ties).
157 See e.g., Roger Cohen, Europe's Migrant Fears Rend a Spanish Town, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2000, at Al (illustrating the violent confrontation between Spaniards
and Moroccan immigrants in the southern coastal town of El Ejido as an event il-
luminating a progressively growing anti-immigrant stance among many Span-
iards and Europeans in general).
158 See e.g., Enrique Figueredo & Silvia Taules, Once detenidos por un ataque rac-
ista contra magrebies en Terrassa, EL MUNDO, May 15, 2003, at 19 (describing the re-
surgence of racial conflict in the Catalonian town of Terrassa that in 1999 saw one
of the worst xenophobic attacks in recent Spanish history).
159 See e.g., Pablo Herraiz, Tensi6n y rabia por la muerte de 'Manu,' EL MUNDO,
May 6, 2005 (describing the racial tension among neighbors in the Madrid suburb
of Villaverde where some Spanish-owned bars have closed their doors to immi-
grants, xenophobic groups have gathered in violent concentrations, and immi-
grant-owned businesses have suffered damages after the killing of a Spanish teen-
ager by a Dominican immigrant).
160 Economic Migrants in Spain, supra note 121, at 829.
161 See BOLETfN EcONOMICo, supra note 11 (providing statistics about the recent
increase in immigration rates).
162 Id.
20071
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [Vol. 28:2
5.2. The Art of Looking Away: A Lesson for Hacienda163
A particular issue of increasing newsworthiness in the United
States is the effect of illegal, rather than legal, immigration on Social
Security. There is mounting evidence that the Internal Revenue
Service welcomes immigrants' taxes, regardless of the immigrants'
legal status in the country.164 The United States provides a Social
Security Number (SSN) to all citizens and residents.165 However,
the IRS also issues a Tax Identification Number (Tax ID) to those
making a request. 66 Since the Tax ID is usually not matched up
with the SSN, individuals without an SSN can pay taxes by using
their Tax ID.167 This system seems to provide an "under-the-table"
win-win situation-the United States collects more taxes than it
could legally require, and the undocumented worker can maintain
the appearance of legal status. Moreover, once illegal immigrants
obtain legalized status, they can retroactively request that their
previous contributions be credited to their social security.168 The
impact of this "looking away" policy on social security collections
is noticeable. 169 The practice has resulted in the creation of an
163 See generally MINISTERIO DE ECONOMIA Y HACIENDA, http://www.minhac
.es/portal (last visited Jan. 23, 2006) (defining Hacienda's mission, which is com-
parable to the U.S. IRS functions).
164 See Eduardo Porter, Illegal Immigrants Are Bolstering Social Security with Bil-
lions, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Illegal Immigrants] (recapitulating
that over the years it has become more common for illegal immigrants to pay
taxes in an effort to show their good faith presence).
165 See Form SS-5, 2, available at http://www.ssa.gov/online/ss-5.pdf (last
visited Jan 23, 2006) (requiring that applicants born outside the U.S. prove their
"U.S. citizenship or current lawful, work-authorized immigration status").
166 See CBS NEws, Illegal Aliens Paying Taxes, Associated Press, Apr. 14, 2003,
available at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/04/14/politics/main549153.shtml
(noting that immigrants who cannot obtain the SSN may opt for a Tax ID in order
to submit federal returns).
167 See id. (explaining that the tax numbers are not shared with immigration
officials).
168 See Porter, supra note 164 ("A comparative handful of former illegal immi-
grant workers who have obtained legal residence have been able to accredit their
previous earnings to their new legal Social Security numbers.").
169 See Feinleib & Warner, supra note 132, at 3 ("Among illegal immigrants,
SSA actuaries currently assume that about half actually pay social security taxes
although they are very unlikely to collect benefits.").
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"earnings suspense file" by the SSA used to account for payments
that come with unaccounted numbers. 170
In contrast, Spain's Hacienda tends not to interact with un-
documented workers until they legalize their status.' 71 In Spain, a
historical underground economy 172 has resulted in networks where
it is hard to reduce illegal employment and in turn difficult for the
government to collect taxes from such behavior. In response, Spain
has enacted amnesty periods to legalize immigration and maxi-
mize revenue collection. After all, the government is more efficient
at collecting payroll tax from legal employees with proper identifi-
cation numbers. However, given Spain's significant number of ir-
regular employees, 173 Spain may want to learn more about the U.S.
"looking away" policy.
5.3. Could Privatization be the Response?
In the United States, both policy makers and academics have
debated the possibility of privatizing Social Security. Privatization
refers to a system where money would be taken out of the general
170 See Porter, supra note 164 (indicating that the financial amount designated
to the "'earnings suspense file'" has been steadily growing through the decade,
"generating $6 billion to $7 billion in Social Security tax revenue").
171 For an explanation of the equivalent to the SSN / Tax ID framework in
Spain, see generally AGENCIA TRIBUTARIA, FACILIDADES PARA DECLARAR RENTA 2006
(2006), available at http://www.agenciatributaria.es/AEAT/Contenidos
_Comunes/LaAgenciaTributaria/Informacion institucional/Campanias/Cam
paniaRenta_2006/informacion/FDeclarRenta2006.pdf. Rather than the dual
framework (SSN option or Tax ID option) in the United States, Spain has three
different identities through which one can pay taxes. First, a Spanish citizen can
use the Documento Nacional de Identidad (National Identity Number),
abbreviated DNI. Second, one can use the Ndomero de Identificaci6n de Extrajeros
(Identity Number for Foreigners), abbreviated as NIE, if one qualifies as a legal
immigrant. Third, one can apply for the Ndimero de Identificaci6n Fiscal
(equivalent to the Tax ID for individuals), abbreviated as NIF. In sum, an
individual will only be able to file tax returns via a NIF, NIE, or DNI, all of which
require citizenship or legalized status. For a more detailed English language
explanation of the three Spanish identification documents, see http://
www.spainexpat.com/spain/information/id-numbers-in .spain/ (last visited
Apr. 7, 2007).
172 See CALAVrrA, supra note 12, at 66 (explaining that in 2005, "about 23 per-
cent of Spain's GDP was provided by the underground economy, making it sec-
ond only to Italy in terms of GDP derived from underground work").
173 See Arango & Jachimowicz, supra note 9 (indicating that 700,000 illegal
immigrants surfaced in response to the 2005 amnesty period).
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social security accounts and trust funds and turned over into pri-
vate investment accounts that individuals would own.174 The
workers would then invest the funds in various financial assets,
particularly mutual funds. At the end of their working lives, indi-
viduals would finance their retirements out of the accumulation of
their accounts.
Implemented in 1981, Chile's system is among the best-known
privatized social security systems.175 Chile was facing the same
demographic trends as the United States and Spain: a mix of in-
creasing beneficiaries and decreasing contributors combined with
mismanagement that forced the system toward bankruptcy.176 In
response, Chile implemented a privatized approach which has
three main components.177 First, each covered worker must place
ten percent of his monthly earnings into an account that is man-
aged by a government-approved financial services firm. Second,
upon retirement, benefits can be taken either as a series of phased
withdrawals or as an annuity. Third, a guaranteed minimum pen-
sion is available for those who have been in the system for a suffi-
cient number of years.
The drawback of privatization is that it could expose individu-
als to more risk because if the stock market turned down, their re-
turns during retirement would suffer.178 The approach undercuts
the fundamental social insurance concept of social security. More-
over, Chile's experience suggests that privatization schemes are
174 See generally Olivia Mitchell & Stephen P. Zeldes, Social Security Privatiza-
tion: A Structure for Analysis 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 5512, 1996) ("Privatization could take many forms. An extreme version
would end all government involvement in the provision of retirement income.").
175 See Peter Diamond, Privatization of Social Security: Lessons from Chile 26
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4510, 1993) (labeling Chile as
an interesting example of a possible solution to the social security design prob-
lem).
176 See Sebastian Edwards & Alejandra Cox Edwards, Social Security Privatiza-
tion Reform and Labor Markets: The Case of Chile, 50 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE
465, 467 (2002) (recounting the emergency state of Chile's social security system
by the late 1970s).
177 See Diamond, supra note 175, at 4 (explaining the mechanics of the Chilean
privatized system).
178 See ISSUES AND ALTERNATIES, supra note 138, at 50 (explaining that
"[p]ersonal accounts expose account holders to uncertainty about their future
benefit levels resulting from uncertainty about future financial market perform-
ance.").
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costly to run.179 On the other hand, some commentators view the
reduction of political risk as one of the main achievements of the
Chilean system. 80 Chile has all but eliminated the possibility that
free-spending politicians will dip into the social security pool.
Currently, the privatized system would be an extreme shift for
Spain. The Spanish Constitution requires a public social security
system;' 81 adopting Chile's scheme would require an amendment.
Moreover, a progressive decline in benefits to the point where re-
tirees must rely on privately funded pensions would not be feasi-
ble either, since this would also conflict with the basic requirement
of a public system inherent in Spain's Constitution. However,
given the scarcity of funds, Spain should at least re-calibrate its
contribution/benefits scheme and encourage current workers to
appreciate the importance of planning for sources of income other
than social security pensions.
6. CONCLUSION
Over the past several years, immigration and social security
trust fund management have emerged as top-rung political issues
in many EU Member States. However, this has been particularly
true in Spain, perhaps because over a decade ago the country had
one of the lowest birth rates, rather high unemployment, and a
great concern about the future of social welfare. Today, the coun-
try has among the highest immigration rates in the EU, a slowly
decreasing unemployment rate, and a vibrant economy. Conse-
quently, there is much debate about where the country stands in
terms of social security pension funding.
The goals of this Comment have been twofold. First, the
Comment explored whether a selective immigration policy could
be used as an instrument to counter demographic shocks to an int-
ergenerational social security pension scheme. As a case study, the
U.S. experience reveals that even in the best sociopolitical climate,
and with the most proactive legislation, immigration alone will
179 See Diamond, supra note 175, at 6 (evidencing that the average administra-
tive costs per affiliate of Chile's privatized system can reach about 30% of the 10%
mandatory savings rate).
180 Id. at 4 (describing the political risks of a pay-as-you-go system where
politicians may increase social security benefits in times of large surpluses and
decrease benefits in times of surplus deficiencies).
181 C.E., art. 41.
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likely not eradicate concerns about demographic effects on the so-
cial security pension scheme. Thus, in addition to immigration, the
need for overall social security reform must be given immediate
priority. Spain may have realized this as well when it was almost
faced with a social security crisis in the late 90s. Because of the
Pact of Toledo, Spain today has a growing social security reserve
fund. Even so, the country cannot drop its guard because of the
imminent baby boom retirement, which will cause a demographic
shock to the social security fund.
Second, the Comment has stressed that if immigration is to
positively help the social security trust fund, it will only do so after
legislators implement a proactive framework within which to
maximize the synergies between immigration and social security
funding. As noted throughout this Comment, as the share of im-
migrants in Spain increases, both policymakers and economists
should analyze the fiscal impact, especially with respect to social
security funding. The most viable intergenerational pay-as-you-go
pension scheme will depend on an efficient immigration policy
that balances the host country's demographics with the final effect
of trying to smooth age distributions so that there will be enough
active labor to fund retirees' pensions. In turn, the ability to do this
will depend on Spain's social, political, and economic growth. As
such, more than pure economics should be at stake while analyz-
ing immigration effects on social security pension schemes. After
considering immigration quotas, labor market absorption rates,
and desired age ranges, the country needs to consider more subjec-
tive issues such as integration.
To summarize, the ideal political agenda in terms of future
immigration and social security funding policies is relatively easy
to identify: only by proactively managing immigration inflows
and making the contracting of irregular immigrants more difficult
and much less attractive can Spain hope to maximize the effects of
immigration to social security contributions. Nonetheless, immi-
gration, especially an immigration influx, will not eradicate demo-
graphic shocks to the reserve fund. There appears to be no single
answer to social security reform. To adhere to the Spanish Consti-
tution and sustain a viable public pension system, a multifaceted
approach must be introduced now so that it will have taken full ef-
fect before the fund is depleted. If enacted promptly, legislative re-
form could be phased-in gradually, avoiding the need for more
radical actions closer to the date of a demographic shock. Spain
should maximize the synergies between social security and immi-
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gration via a continuously proactive approach whereby legislation
focuses on specific goals and forecasts, rather than on the enact-
ment of spontaneous, short-term solutions.
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